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Abstract. This study investigates if the use of derivatives by corporations is likely to affect their
financing strategies. I find a strong positive relation between the minimum revenue guaranteed by
hedging and investment expenditures. This result implies that hedging increases the likelihood that
investments can be financed internally. I also find that firms tend to finance their investment ex-
penditures externally rather than internally. If external capital is more costly than internal capital it
would clearly be in a firm’s interest to reduce its dependence on external capital. Consistent with this
result, I find that the median firm that does not hedge finances 100% of its investment expenditures
externally, while the median firm that hedges finances only 86% of investments externally.
Key words: Financial risk management, hedging, investments, financing policy, financial constraints,
gold mining industry.
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1. Introduction
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) show that firms may have an incentive to hedge
if external capital is costly. In such case, firms use derivatives to increase the
correlation between internal funds and their investments in order to reduce their
dependence on external capital. The purpose of this study is to test if firms indeed
use derivatives for the purpose of reducing their dependence on external capital
markets.1
 I am grateful to Sudipto Dasgupta, Jin Duan, Joseph Fan, Vidhan Goyal, Peter Tufano, Steven
Wei, and an anonymous referee for many valuable suggestions. I would also like to thank George
Allayannis, Ken Eades, Wake Epps and Robert King for their helpful comments on earlier versions
of this paper. Finally, I thank seminar participants at Northwestern University, the University of
Virginia, the 1999 Derivatives Securities conference, and at the 1999 FMA annual meeting for their
comments and discussions. Any remaining errors are my own. Funding was provided by the HKUST
Research Grants Committee under project no. DAG97/98.BM24.
1 This objective is interesting from a financial market development perspective also. If firms
are able to use derivatives to reduce their dependence on external capital markets, then this would
indicate that a well-developed derivatives market can overcome some of the constraints imposed by
a less-developed capital market.
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There are several papers that have tested the empirical relevance of Froot,
Scharfstein and Stein’s (1993) theory. The earliest papers have focused on a firm’s
decision to use derivatives, based on the notion that a firm is more likely to hedge
if the cost differential between internal and external capital is large.2 The empirical
results show that the likelihood to use derivatives increases among larger firms
and among firms with high R&D expenditures. A high R&D budget could indicate
that external capital is relatively costly due to information asymmetries and the
potential for asset substitution, but firm size should be negatively correlated with
the cost differential between internal and external capital. Thus, the empirical res-
ults are ambiguous with respect to Froot, Scharfstein and Stein’s (1993) financial
constraints hypothesis.
A second line of research analyzes the extent of hedging.3 It is not clear, how-
ever, why financial constraints should affect the extent of hedging. In the absence
of any costs of hedging, firms should fully hedge, independent of the magnitude of
their financial constraints. In the presence of costs associated with hedging, firms
should still fully hedge as long as the marginal benefit of hedging outweighs the
costs. Thus, for an interior solution of the hedge ratio to exist, the cost of hedging
must be a convex function of the extent of hedging. Only in this case would a
change in the marginal benefit of hedging, e.g., a change in the magnitude of
financial constraints, affect the extent of hedging. This is a strong requirement,
and the only example that Froot et al. (1993) advanced is the existence of a natural
hedge in which cash inflows and outflows are positively correlated. Since hedging
would destroy this natural hedge, the optimal hedge ratio is less than one. In light
of this argument, it is perhaps not surprising that the empirical studies explaining
the extent of hedging have provided largely inconsistent results with respect to
the financial constraints hypothesis. Some authors, e.g., Haushalter (2000), find
evidence that financial constraints matter, while others, e.g., Tufano (1996), find
the opposite.
Finally, Allayannis and Mozumdar (2000) analyze the effect of hedging on a
firm’s investment/cash flow sensitivity. Following Fazzari et al. (1998), they in-
terpret a positive correlation between investment expenditures and internal cash
flow as an indication of financial constraints, although Kaplan and Zingales (1997,
2000) criticize this interpretation on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Al-
layannis and Mozumdar (2000) show that firms that use derivatives display a lower
investment/cash flow sensitivity than firms that do not use derivatives. This result is
consistent with the hypothesis that hedging reduces financial constraints and thus
lends support to Froot, Scharfstein and Stein’s (1993) theory, but it does not address
the broader question of whether hedging affects financing strategies.
Although the above mentioned empirical papers have provided many valuable
insights about corporate risk management, they suffer from two methodological
2 See Nance et al. (1993), Dolde (1996), Mian (1996), and Ge´czy et al. (1997).
3 See Tufano (1996), Haushalter (2000), Allayannis and Ofek (2001), and Graham and Rogers
(2002).
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limitations with respect to testing the financial constraints hypothesis. The first
problem lies in identifying financially constrained firms. In the past, researchers
have relied on proxy variables such as firm size, debt and liquidity ratios, market-
to-book ratios, dividend policies, existence of a public debt rating, investment/cash
flow sensitivities, etc. to measure the existence or the magnitude of financial
constraints. Whether or not these proxy variables are successful in picking out fin-
ancially constrained firms is highly controversial.4 Second, researchers who study
the effects of risk management typically rely on a control group that represents how
derivatives users would have behaved had they not used derivatives. If the decision
to hedge were random, this approach would be valid and differences between
hedgers and non-hedgers could be attributed to the use of derivatives. However,
previous studies have shown that the decision to hedge is not random but rather a
deliberate choice. Of course, there are econometric models that can control for the
implied selection bias. Since to date we have only a limited understanding of this
choice, it is unlikely that we can eliminate the selection bias completely, indicating
that alternative test procedures are warranted.
To avoid these limitations, this study pursues a different method to answer
the question, “Do firms use derivatives to reduce their dependence on external
capital markets?” Instead of analyzing differences in financing strategies between
hedgers and non-hedgers, this study determines if firms hedge their future invest-
ment expenditures. More concretely, this study examines if hedging increases the
likelihood that future investments can be financed internally.5 In addition, I in-
vestigate how firms finance their investment expenditures. If it can be shown that
firms hedge their future investment expenditures and that the marginal investment
is financed externally, then this would constitute indirect evidence that firms hedge
to reduce their dependence on external capital markets. The advantages of this
approach are that it is not necessary to distinguish between financially constrained
and unconstrained firms and that the group of non-hedgers need not be used as a
control group. The disadvantage of this approach is that it provides only indirect
evidence.
The sample for the econometric analysis is the North American gold mining
industry. This sample choice has several advantages. First, financial constraints
appear to be an important concern in the mining industry. Second, the similarity
in risk exposures among gold mining firms implies that differences in hedging
strategies are not merely reflections of differences in risk exposures but more
likely reflections of differences in firm-specific factors such as financial constraints.
Third, the detailed derivatives disclosures and similar accounting treatments of
4 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) discuss why the relation between financial constraints and proxy
variables is often ambiguous, even on theoretical grounds.
5 Froot et al. (1993) theory is, to my knowledge, the only theory of corporate risk management
that directly associates future investment expenditures with hedging.
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derivatives transactions among gold mining firms make the above mentioned test
method feasible.6
Consistent with previous studies, I find that larger and more mature firms are
more likely to use derivatives than are smaller and less mature firms. The signi-
ficance of the risk exposure is a further important determinant of the decision to
hedge. Less diversified firms are more likely to hedge, which is consistent with the
findings of Allayannis and Ofek (2001). More importantly, I find a strong and ro-
bust relation between the minimum revenue guaranteed by hedging and investment
expenditures, suggesting that firms hedge their future investment expenditures, as
predicted by Froot et al. (1993). In addition, I find that investment expenditures are
a major determinant of the amount of capital that firms raise externally. Finally,
I find that the median firm that does not hedge finances 100% of its investment
expenditures externally, while the median firm that hedges finances only 86% of its
investment expenditures externally. These results are consistent with the hypothesis
that firms hedge to reduce their dependence on external capital markets.
The results are also consistent with Minton and Schrand (1999) who show that
cash flow volatility reduces investment spending. Since accessing external capital
markets is costly (see Myers and Majluf (1984)) firms do not raise external funds to
make up for all their cash shortfalls but they also cut investments. The appropriate
response to this underinvestment problem is not necessarily to reduce volatility
per se but to reduce the negative impact of volatility on investment. By hedging
investments and hence reducing their dependence on external capital markets, firms
seem to be following this rationale.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops testable
hypotheses. Section 3 provides some background information about the gold min-
ing industry. Section 4 describes the data and the construction of variables. Section
5 presents the econometric results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Hypotheses Development
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) showed that firms have an incentive to hedge
if external capital is more costly than internal capital. The purpose of hedging in
this case is to align cash inflows with cash outflows to avoid the use of external
financing. Hedging in this way generates additional cash inflows in those states of
the world in which a firm experiences a cash shortfall. For example, if a firm is
long in one asset and faces certain expenditures in the future, then the risk manage-
ment objective can be achieved by purchasing put options (insurance) or by going
short in forwards. The firm’s future cash inflow would then become certain up to
the hedged amount, ensuring that future expenditures can be financed internally.
Pegasus Gold, a North American gold producer, seems to have adopted such a
hedging strategy. In its 1997 annual report, management writes,
6 See Section 3 for more details.
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The company entered into forward sales contracts to hedge the price risk
associated with its gold sales and to assure itself of a fixed future income
stream over the lives of its operating mines.
Froot et al. (1993) theory would predict that this fixed future income stream is
positively related to the firm’s expected future investment expenditures. Hedging
in this way would imply that future investments can be financed internally inde-
pendent of future gold prices. To test this proposition, I estimate the following
regression model:
FFIS = α + βI + γ Controls + ε,
where FFIS denotes a firm’s fixed future income stream and I denotes the expected
investment expenditures over the next year.7 A firm’s fixed future income stream
may not only be a function of its future expected investment expenditures, but also
a function of the availability of other internal and external financing sources. For
example, if a firm keeps a high cash balance, then it does not need to hedge as
much. Therefore, appropriate control variables are added to the above regression.
The next step is to determine how investments are generally financed. If firms
hedge their future investment expenditures and such investment expenditures are
generally financed externally, then this would represent indirect evidence that firms
reduce their dependence on external capital.8 If investment expenditures were
generally financed internally, however, then hedging would not change the mix
between internal and external financing because hedging cash flows are themselves
a form of internal financing.
To test if investment expenditures are an important determinant of the amount
of external financing raised, I estimate the following regression model:
FINCF = α + βI + γ Controls + ε,
where FINCF stands for a firm’s financing net cash flow, i.e., the net amount of
external capital raised. The coefficient β measures how much external capital firms
raise on average to finance one dollar’s worth of investments. Since the amount of
external capital raised should also be a function of the amount of internal funds
available as well as the financial condition of a firm, appropriate control variables
are added.
Finally, to facilitate the comparison of this study with previous research on risk
management, I analyze the determinants of the decision and the extent of hedging.
Since firms that are more financially constrained have a greater incentive to hedge,
I expect the decision to hedge to be positively related to the magnitude of financial
constraints. However, as explained in the introduction, it is not clear why the extent
7 Both variables will be scaled by firm size to eliminate heteroscedasticity due to size effects.
8 This statement assumes that external capital is more costly than internal capital, giving firms an
incentive to rely on external capital only after all internal sources have been exhausted.
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of hedging should be related to the magnitude of financial constraints. I therefore
expect there to be no or only a weak relationship between them.
3. The Sample
In order to calculate a firm’s fixed future income stream, one must have detailed
knowledge about the nature of a firm’s risk exposure and its derivatives positions.
The gold mining industry is, to my knowledge, the only industry in which risk
exposures are sufficiently simple and in which derivatives disclosures are suffi-
ciently broad such that the fixed future income stream can be calculated for a large
number of firms. Moreover, the gold mining industry is an almost ideal candid-
ate for analyzing what effects financial constraints have on hedging strategies.
First, the industry focus implies that the sample firms share similar risk expos-
ures. Thus, differences in the observed hedging strategies should not be a mere
reflection of differences in exposures, but are more likely a result of differences
in certain firm-specific characteristics such as financial constraints. Second, the
accounting treatment of derivatives cash flows is the same across firms in the
mining industry. This allows me to infer firms’ cash flows with and without the
effect of hedging, which is important for the construction of the control variables.9
Third, financial constraints appear to be a significant concern in the gold mining
industry. Relatively few firms rely on debt and the firms that do tend to have poor
credit ratings. The average S&P senior debt rating for these firms is BB, which is
below investment grade. The causes for this may lie in information asymmetries
and the concentration of most firms on only gold mining activities. Information
asymmetries exist with respect to a mining firm’s major asset: the quality and
quantity of the gold deposit in the ground. Outsiders can verify drill results only
under great cost. These information asymmetries cause debt capital to be relatively
costly. In addition, mining for gold is a high cost/high risk business. The major
financial risk exposure is the future spot price of gold, which is determined by
world demand and supply and hence not under the control of an individual firm.
The gold price exposure is aggravated by limited operational flexibility. For ex-
ample, unit production costs are mainly determined by geological factors of the
deposit, giving management little flexibility in adjusting costs. In addition, firms
in the gold mining industry tend to be small and undiversified. Most firms focus
exclusively on the extraction of gold, which further increases banks’ reluctance to
extend credit to them.10 In times of depressed gold prices, especially since 1998,
9 For a broader set of firms, it is often impossible to precisely infer hedging cash flows (see
Allayannis and Mozumdar (2000)).
10
“While senior companies could arrange financing through the issuance of bonds, debentures,
notes or preferred shares, junior and medium size companies are quite restricted in their ability to
issue corporate IOUs.” (F.H. Khan, Managing Director at Canadian Bond Rating Service (CBRS
Inc.) in “Establishing Credit Ratings for Mining Companies”)
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even equity capital can become prohibitively expensive.11 Hence, it appears that
gold mining firms could ex ante gain significantly from financial risk management
that reduces their dependence on external capital. Finally, the use of derivatives is
widespread in the gold mining industry. By 1997, 70% of all gold mining firms
had implemented risk management programs.12 This is about twice the average of
non-financial firms in the US.
There are four other papers that have investigated risk management practices
in the gold mining industry. Tufano (1996) tests several theories of corporate
hedging. He assumes that firms hedge their future gold production and finds evid-
ence mostly in support of theories of managerial risk-aversion. My analysis differs
in two important aspects from that of Tufano’s. First, I focus on the fixed future
income stream guaranteed by hedging, while Tufano calculates the delta of the
hedge portfolio. Second, I test whether firms hedge sales/production, cash flows,
or investment expenditures, while Tufano implicitly assumes that firms hedge their
future gold production. These differences are significant because if a firm hedges in
order to alleviate the effects of its financial constraints, then the hedging portfolio
must ensure that internal funds are sufficient to finance the firm’s investments. The
question then becomes how much of the future gold production must be sold short
to guarantee that x dollars are available for investments in the next period. Whether
this entails hedging, say, 20% or 40% of production is not a function of financial
constraints, but a function of the size of the firm’s investment program. Therefore,
one should focus on the fraction of investment that can be financed internally, rather
than the fraction of production that has been hedged when evaluating the effects of
financial constraints on hedging strategies.
Brown et al. (2001) examine the time-series characteristics of hedge ratios in
the gold mining industry. They find that little of the variation in hedge ratios can be
explained by traditional risk management theories. Furthermore, the authors find
that some gold producers appear to have superior forecasting ability because an
increase/decrease in their hedge ratios is correlated with a fall/rise in gold prices
during the following one or two quarters. Two further papers examine the effects of
risk management. Tufano (1998) studies gold price exposures for a cross-section
of firms and finds that hedging has only a marginal effect on a firm’s stock price
sensitivity to gold prices. Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000) evaluate the hedging
strategies of Barrick Gold and Homestake Mining, two major gold producers, and
show that differences in operating cost structures could have led Barrick Gold to
use financial hedges while they led Homestake Mining to use operational hedges.
11
“This [decline in gold prices] has limited the cash flow of many gold mining companies world-
wide and restricted the access to capital through either the equity or debt markets.” (TVX Gold Inc.,
1998 annual report, p. 27).
12 See “Gold and Silver Hedge Outlook,” Scotia McLeod Equity Research, 4th quarter, 1997.
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4. Data Sources and Construction of Variables
Annual data on derivatives positions in the North American gold mining industry
are provided by the ‘Gold & Silver Hedge Outlook’, a survey conducted by the
Canadian financial analyst, Ted Reeve, between 1989 and 1999, and published by
Scotia Capital. The survey provides information on the type of derivative instru-
ments used, the size and direction of the positions taken, the delivery prices, and
the maturity of each instrument for a total of 111 companies. These companies
represent almost the entire North American gold mining industry. Companies that
are not included in the survey tend to be small and privately held firms. Table I
provides an example of the raw data. To ensure data accuracy, the survey data are
compared with the derivatives disclosures in the financial footnotes of the firms’
annual reports and 10-K forms.
Most financial data are obtained from the active, Canadian, and research tapes
of the Compustat database. Financial data for firms included in the survey but
not covered by Compustat are collected by hand from the firms’ annual reports
and 10-K forms. Operational data, such as production and reserve statistics, cash
costs, etc., are also collected by hand from the firms’ annual reports and 10-K
forms. Ownership information is obtained from proxy statements and management
information circulars. Financial market data, such as gold spot and futures prices,
interest and exchange rates, etc., are obtained from Datastream.
4.1. DEFINITION OF VARIABLES
The main variables used in this study are a firm’s fixed future income stream,
its expected future investment expenditures, and measures of the availability of
internal and external capital. In addition, I include a measure of the extent of risk
management following Froot et al. (1993) model and variables that have been used
in previous studies to proxy for financial constraints. The construction of most
variables is standard and therefore only summarized in Table II.
Given that gold producers have an inherent long exposure in gold, the fixed
future income stream equals the number of ounces of gold hedged (using forwards,
spot-deferred contracts,13 gold loans14 and put options) multiplied by the respective
delivery prices. For example, suppose a firm expects to produce 200,000 ounces of
gold and enters into forward agreements to deliver 100,000 ounces at a forward
price of $330 per ounce. Assuming the firm produces at least 100,000 ounces, it
will receive a certain cash inflow of $33 million ($330 × 100,000) at the maturity
13 A spot-deferred contract is like a forward contract except that delivery can be deferred for
several years at the discretion of the deliverer. If delivery is deferred, the new delivery price is set
to equal the current forward price plus the future value of the current gain/loss on the contract. The
option to defer delivery therefore amounts only to a guarantee that the hedger can defer any loss on
the spot-deferred contract until the final maturity of the contract.
14 From the perspective of the issuer, the cash flows of a gold loan are identical to the cash flows
from issuing regular debt and selling gold in the forward market.
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Table II. Description and construction of variables
Variable name Construction Data sources
Hedging variables
Fixed future
income stream
Cash inflow during period t + 1 that is certain due to
hedging, in $Mill. The fixed future income stream is
defined by the product of the number of ounces of gold
hedged (using forwards, spot-deferred contracts, gold
loans and put options) and the respective delivery prices.
Only derivatives positions with a maximum of one year
to maturity are considered.
Gold & Silver
Hedge Survey
(1989–1999)
Hedging net
cash flow
Gold production sold × (gold price received – average
gold spot price), during period t + 1, in $Mill.
Datastream,
annual report &
form 10-K
Hedging
dummy
Variable equals one if a firm used derivatives during a
fiscal year and zero otherwise.
Gold & Silver
Hedge Survey
(1989–1999)
Extent of
hedging
Fraction of future investment expenditures that have
been hedged. Variable equals the fixed future income
stream during period t + 1 divided by actual investment
expenditures in period t + 1.
Gold & Silver
Hedge Survey
(1989–1999)
Compustat
Cash flow variables (all variables are in $Mill and refer to period t + 1)
Investment
expenditures
Net investments in plant, property and equipment. Compustat
Net sales Net sales excluding hedging cash flows. Compustat
Operating net
cash flow
Operating net cash flow excluding hedging cash flows. Compustat
Financing net
cash flow
The net amount that has been raised from external capital
markets.
Compustat
Change in cash
position
Change in cash position excluding hedging cash flows. Compustat
Other control variables
Net cash
holdings
Cash and cash equivalents minus debt in current liabilit-
ies, in $Mill.
Compustat
Variables that proxy for the magnitude of financial constraints
Firm size Real market value of assets in 1999 dollars, calculated
using the producer price index for commodities. The
market value of assets equals the book value of assets
minus the book value of common stock plus the market
value of equity.
Compustat,
Bureau of Labor
Statistics
Market-to-book
ratio of assets
Market value of assets divided by book value of assets.
The Market value of assets equals the book value of as-
sets minus the book value of common stock plus market
value of equity.
Compustat
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Table II. Continued
Variable name Construction Data sources
Variables that proxy for the magnitude of financial constraints (continued)
Herfindahl
index
(based on asset
industry
segments)
Defined by
∑N
i=1
(
qi
q
)2
, where qi is the book value of
assets of industry segment i, and q is the total book value
of all reported industry segment assets (non-reported as-
sets such as financial assets are ignored). N is the total
number of industry segments.
Compustat
Herfindahl
index
(based on metals
production)
Defined by
∑N
i=1
( si
s
)
, where si is the revenue contribu-
tion of each metal (estimated as metal production × spot
price), and s is the total metal sales for the year. N is
the total number of metals produced by the firm. If metal
production is zero, a missing value is assigned.
Datastream,
annual report &
form 10-K,
Compustat
Profit margin Difference between gold spot price and cash costs di-
vided by cash costs. Cash costs are the per-unit extraction
costs of gold.
Datastream,
annual report &
form 10-K
Concentrated
ownership
Total percentage of shares that are owned by corpor-
ations, which hold more than 10% of the outstanding
shares of the company.
Proxy Statement
& Management
Information
Circular
Cash dividend
dummy
Dummy variable that equals one if a firm paid cash
dividends and zero otherwise.
Compustat
Credit rating
dummy
Dummy variable that equals one if a credit rating exists
and zero otherwise.
Compustat
Credit rating S&P senior debt rating, ranging from 2 for a AAA rating
to 24 for a C rating. A missing value is assigned if no
credit rating exists.
Compustat
Leverage Book value of long-term debt plus book value of pre-
ferred stock divided by the book value of common equity.
If the book value of equity is negative, a missing value is
assigned.
Compustat
Liquidity Liquidity is measured by a firm’s quick ratio, which
is defined by (cash + cash equivalents + receivables) /
current liabilities.
Compustat
Aggressive
financial policy
Dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s leverage ratio
is above the industry median and its quick ratio below the
industry median.
Compustat
Conservative
financial policy
Dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s leverage ratio
is below the industry median and its quick ratio above the
industry median.
Compustat
All variables refer to time t unless stated otherwise.
174 TIM R. ADAM
of the contract. Theory predicts that this cash inflow is positively related to the
firm’s expected future investment expenditures. To minimize measurement error,
I focus on investments that are scheduled for the next fiscal year and use actual
investment expenditures as the best estimate of the expected investment expendit-
ures.15 Consequently, I consider derivatives positions that mature within one year
only when calculating a firm’s fixed future income stream.16
Investments can be financed externally and/or internally. A firm’s financing net
cash flow represents the net amount of external capital raised during the fiscal year.
Sources of internal financing are a firm’s operating net cash flow, which is defined
by net income plus any non-cash items (depreciation, amortization, etc.). A second
measure of internal financing is the change in the cash position, which reflects the
extent to which cash resources have been depleted to finance various expenditures.
Both of these cash flow variables are affected by hedging. To eliminate the hedging
effect, I calculate a firm’s hedging net cash flow by (the average gold spot price
during the fiscal year – the gold price received) × the gold sold, and subtract this
amount from the operating net cash flow and the change in the cash position. I also
use a firm’s net cash position, defined by cash and cash equivalents minus debt due
in one year, to proxy for a firm’s ability to finance investments with retained cash.
There are several ways to measure the extent of hedging. Tufano (1996) meas-
ures the extent of hedging by a portfolio delta that represents the fraction of future
gold production that has been hedged. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) define the extent
of hedging by the notional principal of derivatives positions divided by the book
value of assets. Graham and Rogers (2002) define the extent of hedging by the net
notional principal and scale this variable by the book value of assets. According
to Froot et al. (1993), firms should hedge their future investment expenditures. I
therefore define the extent of hedging by the ratio of the fixed future income stream
over investment expenditures.
Finally, for the analyses of the decision and the extent of hedging, I need vari-
ables that proxy for financial constraints. Most variables are standard and have been
used before in numerous studies. These are firm size, diversification measures, the
market-to-book ratio of assets, dividend policy, concentration of ownership, the
existence of a credit rating and debt and liquidity ratios. Pulvino (1998) argues
that it is uncertain if a highly levered but also highly liquid firm is financially
constrained. Similarly, no unambiguous inference can be drawn for a firm with
little debt but also low liquidity. Pulvino therefore suggests the use of a dummy
variable that equals one if a firm’s quick ratio is below and its leverage ratio is
15 Alternatively, one could use current investment expenditures to proxy for next year’s expected
investment expenditures. Investments, however, are lumpy. Hence, actual future expenditures prob-
ably provide the better estimate than past investment expenditures. Most econometric results still
hold if current investment expenditures are used, although the statistical significance is lower.
16 A survey sent to the sample firms revealed that gold producers do not tend to roll over derivatives
contracts or expect to close out positions early, but instead match the maturity of the derivative with
the maturity of the exposure hedged. The response rate of the survey was 25.4%.
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above the industry median and zero otherwise to identify financially constrained
firms. A second dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s quick ratio is above
and its leverage ratio is below the industry median and zero otherwise identifies
financially unconstrained firms. I also use these dummy variables in this study.
However, I feel that the first variable more appropriately identifies firms that pursue
an aggressive financial policy while the second variable identifies firms that pursue
a conservative financial policy.
In addition to the standard proxy variables the available data allows me to cal-
culate a firm’s profit margins, which measures the probability of financial distress.
This variable is defined by the difference between the spot price of gold and the
cash production costs per ounce divided by the cash production costs.17 It measures
the sensitivity of a firm’s cash flows to changes in gold prices and is negatively
related to the probability that a mine becomes unprofitable due to a decline in the
gold price. Since the cash flow of a high-cost firm is more sensitive to downside
shocks than the cash flow of a low-cost firm, a firm with a narrower profit margin
faces a greater risk of financial distress.
5. Results
This section first describes some characteristics of firms in the gold mining industry
and then analyzes the determinants of a firm’s fixed future income stream and of a
firm’s external financing net cash flow. Finally, this section presents tests that show
if financial constraints affect the decision to hedge and the extent of hedging.
5.1. A DESCRIPTION OF FIRMS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY
Table III provides descriptive statistics of firms in the North American gold min-
ing industry. The gold mining industry is composed of mostly small firms and
a few senior producers. The median firm has a market value of assets of only
$217 million, while only about 20% of firms have market values in excess of
$1 billion (the sample mean). Most firms concentrate on mining activities only,
as indicated by the generally high values of the Herfindahl index based on firms’
business segment assets. The also relatively high values of the Herfindahl index
based on firms’ metals production indicate that most firms produce only one metal:
gold. Other metals, such as silver, copper and lead, are usually by-products of the
gold production. Despite the focus on only one business segment, profit margins
are low. The average price at which gold producers sold their gold between 1989
and 1999 was only 29% above cash costs.18 If one assumes the market-to-book
ratio of assets to be a proxy for growth opportunities, then there appears to be a
17 Cash production costs include direct mining expenses, stripping and mine development costs,
smelting, refining and transportation costs, and by-product credits.
18 See the previous footnote for a definition of cash costs. Cash costs exclude any non-cash items
such as depreciation, amortization and depletion.
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Table III. Descriptive statistics of gold producers in North America. Variable definitions are given
in Table II. The sample consists of 111 gold mining firms covering the years 1989–1999. There are
a total of 595 firm-years
Median Mean Std. dev 10% 90% N
Firm size 216.7 991.8 1834.4 29.2 3038.4 536
(in 1999 mill. dollars)
Market-to-book ratio 1.567 1.855 1.118 0.853 3.181 536
of assets
Herfindahl index 1 0.924 0.194 0.588 1 550
(asset segments)
Herfindahl index 1 0.867 0.209 0.511 1 503
(metals production)
Profit margin 0.293 0.283 0.213 0.039 0.516 481
Concentrated ownership 0 0.183 0.263 0 0.513 348
Dividend dummy 0 0.415 0.493 0 1 556
Credit rating dummy 0 0.172 0.378 0 1 592
S&P senior debt rating BB+ BB+ BBB+ B 102
Leverage 0.155 0.226 0.257 0 0.522 545
Liquidity 1.680 3.438 6.087 0.247 6.699 553
Aggressive 0 0.316 0.465 0 1 548
financial policy
Conservative 0 0.303 0.460 0 1 548
financial policy
Hedging dummy 1 0.649 0.478 0 1 595
significant dispersion in the growth opportunities across firms. The market-to-book
ratio ranges from 0.29 to 9.08 in the sample. The ownership of most gold mining
firms is also dispersed. The mean fraction of shares held by corporations is 18%
while the median is 0.
The small size of most firms, the relatively low profit margins and the focus
on gold mining only are some reasons why debt capital is relatively expensive.
Consequently, the average debt level in the mining industry is only 23% of assets
and is thus comparatively low. Most of this debt is private. Only 17% of firms
actually have a credit rating and, if one exists, it tends to be below investment
grade. It is therefore not surprising that the majority of firms (59%) do not pay
cash dividends and maintain relatively high levels of liquid assets. The median
quick ratio is 1.68 while the mean is 3.44. Last, it is noteworthy that the majority of
firms (65%) use derivatives, but only 35% of firms that hedge with linear contracts
use spot-deferred contracts.
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Table IV documents the differences between derivatives users and non-users
with respect to the cash flow variables used in this study. Generally, firms that
use derivatives are significantly larger than firms that do not use them. Their sales
are about three times the sales of non-users. Operating net cash flows and invest-
ment expenditures are proportionally similar between hedgers and non-hedgers,
i.e., these variables differ between hedgers and non-hedgers also by a factor of
approximately three. However, firms that use derivatives appear to rely less on
external and more on internal capital sources than firms that do not use derivatives.
The financing net cash flow is proportionally low for hedgers, while their cash
holdings as well as the change in cash holdings are proportionally large. More
concretely, the median firm that does not hedge finances 100% of its investment
expenditures externally, while the median firm that hedges finances only 86% of
investments externally.
5.2. DO FIRMS HEDGE THEIR FUTURE INVESTMENT EXPENDITURES?
Hedging assures gold producers of a minimum revenue from their gold sales. As
shown in Table IV, the average minimum revenue guaranteed by hedging (the fixed
future income stream) is $84 million, which constitutes about one-third of a firm’s
net sales. In this section I investigate if this fixed future income stream is related to
a firm’s investment expenditures.
Table V presents the results of regressions in which the fixed future income
stream is regressed on investment expenditures and several control variables that
measure the availability of internal and external financing sources. For example,
a firm that anticipates accessing external capital markets requires less certainty
about its revenue stream and thus needs to hedge less. The availability of external
financing is measured by a firm’s financing net cash flow, while the availability of
internal financing is measured by net sales, the operating net cash flow, the change
in the cash position, and the net cash holdings at the beginning of the period. Due
to the high correlation between net sales and the operating net cash flow, these two
regressors cannot be included in the same regression.
The first three columns in Table V show the results from the estimation of
fixed-effects models on the pooled sample of derivatives users including all firm-
years between 1989 and 1999. In all three regressions, a firm’s future investment
expenditures are an important determinant of the firm’s fixed future income stream.
None of the control variables is significantly different from zero except net sales.
While some firms may also hedge their sales, this evidence is consistent with firms
hedging their capital expenditures. Thus, through hedging, firms assure themselves
of a fixed future income stream that covers some fraction of their future investment
expenditures.
The previous analysis is based on the sample of derivatives users only. This
approach would be warranted if the decision to use derivatives were random. How-
ever, previous research has shown that the decision to hedge is not random, which
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Table IV. Descriptive statistics of cash flow variables. This table contains descriptive statistics on
firms’ expenditures and financing sources for derivatives users and non-users. Table II contains
descriptions of the variables. The ratio of the financing net cash flow over investment expenditures
captures the maximum fraction of investment expenditures that are finance externally. This ratio is
missing if the financing net cash flow is negative (a firm reduced the amount of external finance), and
set equal to one if the amount of external finance raised is larger than the investment expenditures.
The sample consists of 111 gold mining firms covering the years 1989–1999. There are a total of
595 firm-years. Medians, means, and percentiles are given in millions of US$
Median Mean Std. dev 10% 90% N
Panel A: Derivatives Users
Fixed future income stream 24.1 83.7 188.6 1.8 205.0 386
Hedging net cash flow 0.8 10.1 35.4 −0.6 23.0 386
Net sales 75.6 270.8 592.2 11.0 654.4 364
Operating net cash flow 10.2 46.7 94.1 −3.5 134.9 361
Investment expenditures 23.4 69.3 108.1 3.8 210.5 363
Financing net cash flow 2.75 16.4 95.5 −42.1 98.6 361
Financing net cash flow/ 0.86 0.68 0.36 0.09 1 178
investment expenditures
Change in cash position −2.0 −8.4 63.4 −62.6 44.9 363
Net cash holdings 12.1 50.7 112.2 −9.8 181.9 362
Panel B: Derivatives Non-Users
Net sales 19.6 108.1 294.2 0.4 190.2 193
Operating net cash flow 1.9 21.7 76.8 −4.2 49.5 192
Investment expenditures 6.8 30.7 83.5 0.7 61.6 192
Financing net cash flow 1.2 9.7 67.9 −8.9 47.8 192
Financing net cash flow/ 1 0.71 0.38 0.06 1 113
investment expenditures
Change in cash position −0.3 −0.4 43.8 −15.6 33.3 192
Net cash holdings 6.0 29.1 67.5 −3.8 118.8 193
implies that the regression coefficients may be biased. To control for this selection
bias I employ Heckman’s selection model (see Heckman, 1976). Unfortunately, the
maximum likelihood estimation does not converge when the full panel data set is
used. I therefore calculate time-series averages from the firm-year observations of
a single firm. If a company hedged for only some of the years during the sample
period, I calculate two mean values: one based on those firm-years in which the
company hedged and a second one based on those firm-years in which the company
did not hedge. The estimation results are reported in the last three columns of Table
V. A firm’s investment expenditures appears again to be the most important determ-
inant of a firm’s fixed future income stream. A coefficient of about 0.6 implies that
firms hedge 60% of their investment expenditures on average.
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Table VI. Financing strategies (correlation coefficients). This table lists correlation coefficients
between investment expenditures, and internal and external sources of financing for three sub-
samples: the full sample, the subsample of only derivatives users and the subsample of only
derivatives non-users. The correlation coefficients in Panel A are based on level data, whereas the
correlation coefficients in Panel B are based on changes. Variable definitions can be found in Table
2. The sample consists of 111 gold mining firms and covers the years 1989 to 1998. All variables
refer to the same time period, and are scaled by the book value of assets to eliminate size effects.
Correlation coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1% level appear in bold face.
Investment expenditures
Full sample Derivatives users Derivatives non-users
Panel A: Analysis of Levels
External Financing net cash 0.482 0.442 0.542
financing flow
Internal Operating net cash 0.060 0.162 −0.077
financing flow
Internal Change in cash 0.002 −0.044 0.043
financing position
Panel B: Analysis of Changes
External Financing net cash 0.275 0.337 0.167
financing flow
Internal Operating net cash 0.036 0.073 −0.022
financing flow
Internal Change in cash 0.084 0.095 0.052
financing position
5.3. HOW FIRMS FINANCE THEIR INVESTMENT EXPENDITURES
This section analyzes the determinants of a firm’s financing net cash flow. In
particular, I am concerned with the question of how firms typically finance their
investment expenditures. Table VI presents correlation coefficients between firms’
investment expenditures and internal and external financing sources. Irrespective of
whether or not firms use derivatives, investment expenditures display the highest
correlations with a firm’s financing net cash flow (external financing). This result
holds for levels and for changes. Thus, the correlation coefficients suggest that
investments on average as well as the marginal investment project are financed
externally rather than internally.
To test if a change in investment expenditures causes a change in the amount
of external financing a firm raises, Table VII presents the results of regressions
in which firms’ financing net cash flows are regressed on firms’ investment ex-
penditures. The regressions are controlled for by other variables that measure the
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availability of internal funds and proxies for financial constraints. The analysis is
conducted both on levels as well as on changes.
The coefficients on investment expenditures are statistically significant and eco-
nomically large. They suggest a 1 : 1 relationship between investment expenditures
and the amount of external financing raised.19 The sensitivity between investment
expenditures and the financing net cash flow is lower for firms that hedge. However,
the coefficient on the interaction term is statistically significant in only one of the
four regressions in Table VII. The regression results further indicate that firms
that have high operating net cash flows and maintain large cash balances raise
less external financing. These results are confirmed if the regression is controlled
by variables that proxy for financial constraints. Given the relatively high R2’s
for a cross-section analysis, the data suggest that investment expenditures are an
important determinant of how much external financing firms raise. Together with
the previous finding, that firms’ fixed future income stream is strongly positively
related to future investment expenditures, this represents indirect evidence that
firms hedge in order to reduce their dependence on external capital.
5.4. DO FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AFFECT IF AND HOW MUCH FIRMS HEDGE?
To provide a basis for comparison to previous studies in corporate risk manage-
ment, I analyze the decision to hedge and the extent of hedging in this section.
Since the determinants of the decision to hedge are likely to be different from
the determinants of the extent of hedging I estimate a variant of the tobit model
proposed by Cragg (1971). The estimation of this model is performed in two steps.
In the first step, a standard probit model is estimated to analyze the determinants
of the decision to hedge. The dependent variable takes on a value of one if a firm
hedges and zero otherwise. In the second step, a truncated model is estimated on
the subsample of derivatives users only to analyze the determinants of the extent of
hedging. The extent of hedging is defined as the fixed future income stream over
investment expenditures. This ratio represents the fraction of future investment
expenditures that have been hedged.
The results are reported in Table VIII. Consistent with previous studies, I find
that larger firms and firms that face greater exposure to gold prices (i.e., firms
that primarily produce gold) are more likely to use derivatives than smaller firms
and firms that produce a variety of metals. A further important determinant of the
decision to hedge is the amount of liquidity a firm holds. Firms that hold more
liquidity are less likely to hedge, which suggests that firms hold liquid assets as
a substitute for hedging. Somewhat puzzling, I find a negative relation between
the market-to-book ratio and the decision to hedge. The market-to-book ratio may
proxy for several variables. Previous research has used this variable to measure
growth opportunities as well as corporate performance.20 The negative coefficient
19 The coefficients are not statistically different from one.
20 See Adam and Goyal (2002) for a summary of this literature.
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Table VII. Why firms raise external financing? The dependent variable is firms’ financing net
cash flow. Variable definitions can be found in Table II. Figures in parentheses denote t-statistics
and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. All cash flow variables are scaled by the book value of
assets to eliminate size effects. All regressions include time dummies.
Analysis of Levels Analysis of Changes
Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects
Hedging dummy 0.080 0.059 −0.009 −0.004
(1.631) (1.072) (−0.242) (−0.113)
Investing expenditures 1.129*** 0.961*** 0.930*** 0.555**
(7.141) (4.597) (3.997) (2.235)
Investing expenditures × −0.424** −0.308 −0.154 −0.023
hedging dummy (−1.995) (−1.286) (−0.593) (−0.083)
Operating −0.613*** −0.764*** −0.581*** −0.496***
net cash flow (−4.102) (−4.920) (−4.498) (−3.790)
Hedging 1.033 0.476 0.565 0.760
net cash flow (1.623) (0.718) (0.967) (1.345)
Net cash holdings −0.258** −0.230** −0.562*** −0.523***
(−2.556) (−1.969) (−6.355) (−5.770)
Firm size −0.123*** −0.241***
(−3.135) (−5.879)
Market-to-book ratio 0.084*** 0.057**
(3.867) (2.565)
Herfindahl index 0.096 0.213
(asset segments) (0.664) (1.513)
Herfindahl index 0.087 −0.153
(metals production) (0.593) (−1.049)
Profit margin 0.126 0.059
(1.318) (0.510)
Rating dummy −0.054 −0.029
(−0.924) (−0.504)
Dividend dummy 0.023 0.014
(0.384) (0.243)
Aggressive 0.093** 0.056
financial policy (2.296) (1.378)
Conservative 0.038 0.061
financial policy (0.921) (1.510)
Observations 441 374 407 352
Adjusted R2 0.326 0.382 0.293 0.401
**, and *** denote significance at the 5%, and 1% level respectively.
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would indicate that firms with fewer growth opportunities or below average per-
formance are more likely to hedge. In the mining industry, the market-to-book ratio
may also proxy for the maturity of a mining corporation. The primary activities in
mining are exploration, development and production. A high market-to-book ratio
may identify firms that are mostly involved in exploration and development and
hence have a lot of growth options relative to their assets in place. A low market-
to-book ratio may identify firms that are mostly involved in production and hence
have fewer growth options relative to their assets in place. Since producers that
are still in the exploration and development stages have no immediate transaction
exposure to gold, they are less likely to hedge. Thus, if the market-to-book ratio
captures the maturity of firms, then it would explain why more mature firms with
relatively fewer growth options are more likely to hedge.
I do not find statistically significant relationships between the decision to hedge
and other variables that may proxy for the existence or the magnitude of financial
constraints, such as asset diversification across different business segments, profit
margin, ownership structure, dividend policy, existence of a credit rating, leverage,
and whether a firm pursues an aggressive or a conservative financial policy. Given
that large firms are more likely than small firms to hedge, which is opposite to what
a financial constraints argument would predict, I conclude that financial constraints
are unlikely to drive the decision to hedge on average.
With respect to the extent of hedging, there is some evidence that the market-
to-book ratio, the credit rating dummy, and the quick ratio are all negatively related
to the extent of hedging. In addition, the Herfindahl index (asset segments) appears
to be positively related to the extent of hedging. These results would support the
conclusion that the magnitude of financial constraints does affect the extent of
hedging. However, the respective coefficients are not statistically significant in all
regressions. So, the empirical evidence is weak.
Even though I did not find convincing evidence that financial constraints affect
the decision or the extent of hedging, I do not think this is sufficient to reject Froot
et al. (1993) model. As argued previously, it is controversial if the proxy variables
are successful in measuring financial constraints. In addition, the extent of hedging
has no clear theoretical relation to the magnitude of financial constraints. Further-
more, it is possible that some firms decide not to hedge, not because they are less
financially constrained but because other concerns are more important to them, e.g.,
shareholders’ preferences towards hedging.21 In such a case, I would not expect to
find a significant relation between financial constraints and the decision to hedge.
In contrast, Froot et al. (1993) model is, to my knowledge, the only model that
links hedging activities to investment expenditures. The empirical results confirm
this link and thus imply that Froot, Scharfstein and Stein’s model describes actual
hedging behavior.
21 For example, until 1997 Homestake Mining deliberately chose not to hedge because manage-
ment argued that shareholders invested in Homestake because of the gold exposure.
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6. Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that
firms hedge their future investment expenditures. Since investment expenditures
are typically financed externally, but hedging cash flows are a form of internal fin-
ancing, this finding implies that firms hedge to reduce their dependence on external
capital markets. Consistent with this result, I find that firms that do hedge finance
a smaller fraction of their investment expenditures externally than do firms that do
not hedge. This result is significant not only because it gives credibility to Froot et
al. (1993) theory of corporate risk management, but also because it suggests that a
well-developed derivatives market can overcome some of the constraints imposed
by a less-developed capital market.
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